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Cultural environments and the appointment of female directors on boards: 




The impact of the six cultural dimensions of Hofstede (power distance, individualism, masculinity, 
uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation and indulgence) on the presence of female directors on 
boards has not been previously examined, as far as we know. Past research has focussed on four or five 
of these six cultural dimensions. Thus, the aim of this research is to analyse how board gender diversity 
is affected by all of the Hofstede cultural dimensions in a sample of firms operating in different 
countries. The data for this research was collected from Thomson Reuters database. The paper is drawn 
on institutional theory, which suggests the idea that firms are influenced by cultural aspects, since 
organisations are not separated from their environment, but interact with their environment through 
relationships with stakeholders. The findings show that cultural dimensions such as power distance, 
individualism and indulgence have a positive effect on the proportion of women directors on boards. In 
contrast, the dimensions of masculinity and long-term orientation affect it negatively, while uncertainty 
avoidance does not influence it. 
 


















1. Introduction  
A board of directors is a governing body of a company whose functions are to supervise and to 
control the management of the company, and the board’s composition is considered of the greatest 
importance for it to be efficient (Bhagat and Black, 2000). Within board composition, the representation 
of women is becoming very important. As some authors argue (Terjesen et al., 2009; Bennouri et al., 
2018; Gul et al., 2011; Gull et al., 2018; Lai et al., 2017), women in management positions are more 
diligent than men, exhibit higher levels of independence and are more likely to worry about the interests 
of shareholders. Other authors such as Schubert (2006) believe that there is a consensus among 
academics that female directors on boards tend to be more risk-averse and are more concerned with 
ethical issues than men when making decisions within an organisation. All of this has resulted in an 
increase in the worldwide interest in regulating the participation quotas of women on boards, with 
Nordic countries such as Norway, Sweden and Finland having the highest representation with 44.2%, 
26.9% and 25%, respectively (Catalyst, 2011). 
Among the reasons that can explain the different levels of women's access to boards, the 
prevailing culture in each country has been recognised as a critical factor. Culture can create stereotypes1 
of roles associated with men and women that can affect women's access to boards (Carrasco et al., 2015). 
Concerning past research focussed on analysing the impact that the cultural context has on the 
presence of women on boards, one of the first investigations was carried out by Sealy et al. (2009) in 
the context of four European countries. These authors show that it is crucial to consider the cultural and 
political contexts when board diversity is examined, particularly board gender diversity. Warner-
Soderholm et al. (2016) base their study on European countries and find cultural variables that could 
promote the successful participation of women on boards within companies belonging to those European 
countries. Their evidence shows significant relationships between power distance, uncertainty 
avoidance, future orientation, assertiveness and higher levels of implementation of women on boards. 
This finding supports the idea that culture plays an important role in the decision-making process of 
appointing board members. Later research has focussed on international companies. In this regard, 
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Carrasco et al. (2015) use a sample of international companies belonging to 32 countries and Gyapong 
and Afrifa (2009) use a sample of microfinance institutions (MFIs) across 61 countries. Both works use 
the national culture framework proposed by Hofstede (1983, 2001), later improved by Hofstede et al. 
(2010). The empirical evidence is mixed with respect to the effect of culture on the presence of women 
on boards when comparing different countries. Thus, it is essential to deepen the understanding of this 
issue. 
This research is framed within institutional theory, which allows a comparative examination of 
the effects of culture on the presence of women directors on boards (Ianotta et al., 2016). This approach 
suggests that companies are integrated into a nexus of formal and informal institutions, including culture, 
which directly influence their activities. Therefore, we use institutional theory to systematically expound 
the effects of culture on the proportion of female directors on boards (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Scott, 2001). 
Taking into account the above arguments, the aim of this research is to provide greater evidence 
of the impact of different cultures on the representation of women directors on boards from the 
perspective of institutional theory. To do so, we follow the cultural dimensions proposed by Hofstede 
(1983), Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) and Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010), which are embodied 
in power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation and 
indulgence. In general, the main results of this research show that certain cultural dimensions such as 
power distance, individualism and indulgence have a positive effect on the presence of women on 
boards. In contrast, masculinity and long-term orientation are negatively associated with board gender 
diversity, while uncertainty avoidance does not impact it.  
This research contributes to past literature in several ways. Firstly, our evidence expands the 
literature on how national culture influences the presence of women directors on boards. Specifically, 
we have considered an international sample of companies from 27 countries, compared to previous 
studies that have focussed on different countries to ours or geographical areas, and even on different 
sectors of activity (e.g. Gyapong and Afrifa, 2019). Secondly, in this research, we use the six cultural 
dimensions proposed by Hofstede in contrast to other investigations, where only four of the proposed 
dimensions have been considered. Thus, in this research we have also considered long-term orientation 
and indulgence, cultural dimensions that have hardly been analysed in preceding studies. Therefore, this 
contribution complements and improves past evidence. A third contribution comes from the findings 
provided, since all the dimensions do not equally affect the presence of women directors on boards. 
Some dimensions are positively associated with the presence of female directors on boards and others 
negatively or with no relationship. In summary, it is considered relevant for companies to analyse the 
cultural factors influencing the presence of women directors on their boards. In this regard, the different 
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levels of representation of women directors on boards, when comparing different countries, is largely 
explained by the culture that prevails in each country. 
The paper is developed in the following sections. The theoretical framework relative to national 
culture and women on corporate boards is described in the following section. In section three, the 
hypotheses proposed in this research are presented. Section four provides the methodology and the 
variables used. In section five, the results are analysed and finally, in section six, the conclusions and 
implications of our findings are drawn. 
 
2. National culture and women on corporate boards 
According to institutional theory, organisations are influenced by cultural aspects (Scott, 2008) 
since they are not separated from their environment, but they interact with it through relationships with 
different stakeholders. Thus, the cultural norms that surround a company have a deep effect on the values 
and behaviour promoted within an organisation, since they are consistent with the beliefs and norms of 
society. This allows companies to be socially acceptable and obtain the necessary resources and 
legitimacy that contribute to their performance and survival. 
Therefore, it is important to determine what culture is and how it affects the presence of women 
on boards. For Vitell et al. (2003), culture may be defined as a collective programming of the mind, 
highly invisible, unconscious and difficult to change, affecting the basic values of citizens and, at the 
same time, of business. In the same vein, Parboteeah and Cullen (2003, p. 138) consider that culture 
represents a historically determined set of implicit and explicit abstract notions and beliefs (that is, what 
it is good, correct and desirable), shared by a group of individuals who have experienced a common 
historical experience. These cultural values, norms, beliefs and assumptions are symbolically reinforced 
and transmitted through socialisation and training from generation to generation. For other authors such 
as Su (2006) and Tsakumis (2007), national culture has an important impact on the decision-making 
process’s ethic and is expected to influence organisational structure, behaviour of managers and business 
performance (Richardson and Boyd, 2005; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Lubatkin et al., 2007). Along 
these lines, seminal papers such as by Friedland and Alford (1990), Hofstede (1991) and Hickson and 
Pugh (1995) conclude that the cultural characteristics of a country, such as features of its institutional 
environment, have a great influence on the corporate governance structure of firms.  
Within this corporate governance, boards become relevant because they are responsible for 
supervising business management and the strategies to be carried out. Therefore, boards must be 
efficient for companies to succeed in the development of their activity. In this regard, board composition 
is precisely one of the most important aspects to consider when analysing board efficiency and 
effectiveness (Bhagat and Black, 2000). Specifically, the presence of female directors on boards is 
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becoming highly significant (Guest, 2019). As Carter et al. (2003) claim, the presence of women 
directors on boards provides different perspectives and alternatives by encouraging discussion and 
improving problem-solving, since women are considered more reflective when making decisions. 
Additionally, they can provide new ideas and improve communication (Milliken and Martins, 1996; 
Grosvold and Brammer, 2011; Brammer et al., 2009). 
However, past evidence suggests that this statement is not always fulfilled, especially when 
analysing companies from different countries, where the presence of women on boards is different, 
depending on the country (Catalyst, 2008). Thus, Norway holds first place with 44.2% of women 
represented on boards, and Sweden holds second place with 26.9%, followed by Finland and Denmark 
with 25% and 18.1%, respectively. In other countries such as Spain or Italy, only 6.6% and 2.1% 
representation are obtained, respectively. In a later report (Catalyst, 2015), it is revealed for S&P 500 
companies that only 19.9% of women held positions on boards and that 2.8% of S&P 500 companies 
had zero women directors; 24.6% had one woman and only 14.2% of companies had 30% or more 
women on their boards. 
Some authors such as Li and Harrison (2008) suggest that the different levels of representation 
of women on boards, when comparing different countries, is largely explained by the culture that 
prevails in each country. In this vein, culture can create stereotypes of roles associated with men and 
women that can affect the presence of female directors on boards. On the other hand, Gupta et al. (2002) 
show groups of countries that have common cultural characteristics and identify a total of 10 different 
geographical groups. Moreover, these authors analyse cultural attitudes towards gender and how they 
can impact the opportunities and ambitions of the executive careers of women. For Parboteeah et al. 
(2008), gender differentiation is the degree to which men and women are viewed differently by society. 
When gender differentiation is lower, women are more likely to assume high positions of responsibility 
(Javidan and House, 2001). Thus, the Nordic countries have low levels of gender differentiation, while 
in Anglo-Saxon and Latin American countries, gender differentiation is greater (Gupta et al., 2002). 
In this line of research based on the influence of national culture on the participation of women 
directors on boards, we can also refer to the paper of Carrasco et al. (2015). This research focusses on a 
sample of international companies belonging to 32 countries and analyses how cultural dimensions 
affect the presence of women on boards. Their findings show that countries with a high tolerance for the 
distribution of power and high rates of masculinity have low participation rates of women in senior 
management positions. In a further work, carried out by Gyapong and Afrifa (2019), for a sample of 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) across 61 countries and using the national culture framework proposed 
by Hofstede (1983, 2001), later improved by Hofstede et al. (2010), it is revealed that in countries with 
a high level of uncertainty avoidance and individualism, the number of female directors on boards is 
lower. On the contrary, in countries with high power distance, they appoint more women in top 
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management positions. Therefore, past empirical evidence shows that there are differences regarding 
the presence of women on boards when comparing different countries, so it is necessary to deepen the 
understanding of this issue. 
 
3. Research hypotheses  
The impact of culture is usually analysed using the dimensions proposed by Hofstede (1980, 
2001), Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) and Hofstede et al. (2010). Although the Hofstede model initially 
considered four cultural dimensions (i.e., power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism and 
masculinity), later two others (i.e., long-term orientation and indulgence) were incorporated. These 
dimensions give an important theoretical framework, not only to analyse national culture, but also to 
consider the effects of cultural differences on the presence of female directors on boards. According to 
Hoecklin (1996), this theoretical framework is especially useful for understanding people's conception 
of what an organisation is, the mechanisms that are considered appropriate to control and coordinate the 
activities within it and the roles and relationships of its members. Considering the above, the research 
hypotheses are then formulated for each of the Hofstede's cultural dimensions to analyse the presence 
of women directors on boards in different cultural contexts. 
 
3.1. Power distance  
Power distance is one of the dimensions proposed by Hofstede (2001) and it describes the level 
of the hierarchy of a society. This dimension represents the degree to which members of institutions and 
organisations within a given culture expect and accept that power is distributed unevenly. Inequality can 
appear in what each individual contributes to society and what it receives from it, in the distribution of 
power or in the rights and duties of each individual. Authors such as Waldman et al. (2006) argue that 
cultures with greater power distance accept that the hierarchy between superiors and subordinates is 
extensive and legitimate. In this regard, Miska et al. (2018) support that in cultures with high power 
distance, people tend to differentiate in classes according to different criteria. The power bases tend to 
be stable and power is considered to provide social order, relational harmony and stability.  
Regarding the relationship between power distance and the presence of women on boards, the 
established order of power has given rise to boards made up mainly by men, and in high-power societies, 
this order will not have much opposition when it is about sharing power and seats on boards (Hillman 
et al., 2002). Hence, considering that power is distributed unequally as something natural, members of 
society tend to accept their position in the social system in countries with high distances to power. 
Previous evidence (Singh et al., 2002) finds that women participate less than men in the power structure 
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in organisations and, therefore, women can consider this as an order of legitimate inequality. This may 
explain the women's own rejection of promotion within organisations or actively directing their careers 
for promotion in the company (Farrell and Hersch, 2005). 
Considering the above arguments, it seems to be expected that in those societies that show 
greater value for the distance to power, the levels of representation of women on boards would be lower. 
Thus, we expect a relationship between both variables to be negative (Simmons et al., 2012). To analyse 
this association, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H1: The higher the power distance in a society is, the lower the presence of female directors on 
boards will be. 
 
3.2. Individualism  
In these types of societies, people feel comfortable with having the authority to make decisions 
based on what the individual thinks is the best. The freedom and independence of the individual are 
considered of great importance, and priority is given to personal interests over the social group. 
According to Bradley et al. (2013), in an individualistic culture, people are more likely to make decisions 
independently in favour of their own goals or achievements. Therefore, an individualistic culture is 
supposed to encourage risk-taking and reward business behaviours. 
According to Li and Harrison (2008), in highly individualistic societies people are more 
concerned with personal interest, and boards with more outside directors convey that boards defend the 
interests of different stakeholders in society. Furthermore, within a society with high individualism, the 
exchange of private and individual opinions is highly promoted and valued, generating the expression 
of thoughts, advice and counsels. Therefore, within societies characterised by individualism, a positive 
relationship is expected between the role of directors and firm performance. Furthermore, individualism 
is expected to positively affect the degree of female participation on boards, as companies try to 
legitimise themselves by representing a more diverse range of individual interests, and may reflect, as 
indicated by Carrasco et al. (2015), a commitment to individual human rights, which could include 
gender equality based on personal merit. 
Considering the above, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H2: The higher the individualism in a society is, the higher the presence of female directors on 
boards will be. 
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3.3. Masculinity  
The dimension of masculinity refers to gender and the role of men in society. Male oriented 
cultures tend to be assertive and tend towards material success, while those with a female orientation 
tend to be more modest and focussed on quality of life. Societies that consider themselves masculine 
describe men as assertive, aggressive, ambitious, competitive and materialistic (Hofstede, 2001). At the 
same time, in this type of society, cooperative behaviour is less appreciated. 
For Orij (2010), masculinity is the opposite of the social orientation of a culture. Authors such 
as Peng et al. (2014) observe that in cultures with a high degree of masculinity, values such as 
professional career and business success are given more importance. Additionally, Gyapong and Afrifa 
(2019) argue that institutions in male societies are more likely to be dominated by men, since in these 
societies administrative decisions and performance orientation prevail and more emphasis is placed on 
competitive behaviour with the objective of achieving economic achievements or results (Chizema et 
al., 2015). 
Regarding the relationship between masculinity and the presence of women on boards, it seems 
to be negative. In this regard, Oakley (2000) supports that the attribution of traditional values to women 
may bias their choices as board members, since it is precisely masculine societies that defend gender 
roles in a traditional way. 
According to Hofstede (2001), in a masculine society the administrative decisions, the 
performance orientation and the emphasis on competitive behaviour are highly valued, and high values 
of the masculinity cultural dimension indicate that the values associated with the masculine role prevail 
in society. These arguments lead us to expect a negative relationship between masculinity and the degree 
of female directors on boards (Carrasco et al., 2015).  
Therefore, considering the above, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H3: The higher the masculinity in a society is, the lower the presence of female directors on 
boards will be. 
3.4. Uncertainty avoidance  
According to Sully de Luque and Javidan (2004, p. 602), uncertainty avoidance is ‘the extent to 
which ambiguous situations are threatening to individuals, to which rules and order are preferred, and 
to which uncertainty is tolerated in a society’. Societies with high uncertainty avoidance impose more 
rules and regulations on people and tolerate less change (De Mooij and Hofstede, 2010). Hofstede (2001) 
argues that people in cultures with high uncertainty avoidance feel more anxious and, therefore, tend to 
take immediate measures to reduce levels of ambiguity. 
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Gaspay et al. (2008) support that cultures with high levels of uncertainty avoidance are more 
risk-sensitive and perceive a higher level of uncertainty in each situation. Thus, Bilimoria and Piderit 
(1994) consider that companies are sometimes reluctant to hire women in managerial positions, since 
risk and uncertainty are perceived when they are appointed. Therefore, in countries where the level of 
uncertainty avoidance is high, it is expected to have fewer women on boards.  
For Carrasco et al. (2015), in cultures with high levels of uncertainty avoidance, members of 
society base their behaviour on clear procedures, well-known strategies and well-understood norms to 
reduce uncertainty and deal with unknown situations. Regarding women, they provide a different 
perspective in the debate and the decision-making process (Zelechowski and Bilimoria, 2004), so it is 
likely that in new cultures with less aversion to uncertainty, new approaches and ideas will be accepted 
more easily within boards. In this context, there is greater tolerance towards uncertainty and different 
ideas, approaches and concepts and, therefore, also a greater tolerance or acceptance of a greater 
presence of women on boards. Considering the previous arguments, we posit the following hypothesis: 
H4: The higher the uncertainty avoidance in a society is, the lower the presence of female 
directors on boards will be. 
 
3.5. Long-term orientation  
This dimension suggests that a society attaches great importance to future events. In addition, 
individuals who belong to this type of society believe that the truth depends a lot on the situation, context 
and time and have a strong propensity to save and invest, being known for their cunning and 
perseverance (Hofstede et al., 2010). In the same vein, authors such as Van Everdingen and Waarts 
(2003) argue that cultures with a long-term orientation are characterised by values such as persistence, 
the adaptation of traditions to new circumstances, personal adaptability and the idea that the most 
important events of life will occur in the future. Therefore, companies in cultures with a long-term 
orientation will focus more on future results, and will be more receptive to changes than companies that 
operate in a culture of short-term orientation. This dimension is also called the Confucian dynamic, 
named after Confucius, whose ideology influenced the majority of Eastern cultures (Hofstede, 2001). 
Although Hofstede and Bond (1988) suggested that long-term oriented countries could be in the middle 
range of masculinity versus femininity, long-term orientation is still present in countries with a 
Confucian dynamic, that is, those that do not respect traditions. 
Countries with short-term orientation care about establishing absolute truth, firmness, stability 
and respect for tradition. In this vein, Warner-Soderholm et al. (2016) find that lower scores in future 
orientation will positively impact the number of women on boards. On the contrary, in countries with a 
long-term orientation, where there is still a Confucian heritage that opposes the respect of traditions 
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(Hofstede and Bond, 1988; Moulettes, 2007), the dominant roles of men in society and organisations 
seem to predominate, so a long-term orientation would negatively affect the presence of women on 
boards. 
Therefore, the hypothesis proposed is the following: 
H5: The higher the long-term orientation is, the lower the presence of female directors on 
boards will be. 
 
3.6. Indulgence  
This dimension is the last in the cultural framework of Hofstede (Hofstede et al. 2010) and is 
related to the gratification of basic human desires related to enjoying life. Indulgent societies are more 
permissive in relation to natural human desires with respect to enjoying life and having fun. Some of 
the most important characteristics of this type of society are greater importance of leisure, freedom of 
expression and being happy, which a large percentage of people in these societies declare themselves to 
be, among other aspects. In this regard, as Ismail and Lu (2014, p.45) suggest, ‘people in indulgence 
societies prefer happiness and tend to create a perception of freedom, health, and control over life. Its 
opposite pole, restraint culture, refers to a society that controls the gratification of the above-mentioned 
desires and feelings’. 
Regarding the relationship between the cultural dimension of indulgence and the presence of 
women directors on boards, there are currently not too many papers exploring this association.  
According to Hofstede et al. (2010), the gender roles of indulgent societies are freely prescribed, 
while in restraint cultures we find that gender roles are strictly prescribed. In addition, authors such as 
Mukazhanova (2012) argue that the principles established for male societies contradict some of the 
principles of indulgence and, therefore, no importance would be given to aspects such as professional 
career or business success, relevant objectives in cultures with a high degree of masculinity (Peng et al., 
2014), although it would be important to have positive emotions in the workplace and in everyday life. 
Therefore, and according to previous studies (e.g. Griffith and Rubera, 2014) that predict a positive 
relationship between indulgence and other business aspects, we hypothesise a positive effect of 
indulgent cultures on the presence of women directors on boards. Thus, indulgent societies can foster 
the presence of women directors on boards as a way of continuously satisfying freedom of expression 
as well as greater permissiveness. The following hypothesis is proposed: 
H6: The higher the indulgence in a society is, the higher the presence of female directors on 
boards will be. 
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4. Empirical Method  
 
4.1 Data and sample 
The initial sample collected from the Thomson Reuters database consists of 16,698 international 
firm-year observations, covering the period from 2004 to 2015. Nevertheless, from this initial sample, 
4,269 firm-year observations have been excluded. Specifically, financial entities have been removed 
from the sample because their financial statements are incomparable with those of industrial firms. This 
is because financial entities prepare their financial statements with different accounting rules. 
Additionally, all those firms for which it was impossible to collect all necessary data for the research 
were also removed from the sample. Thus, the final unbalanced panel data sample is composed of 12,429 
firm-year observations.  
In the sample, there are 27 countries represented: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, 
Chile, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. Table 1 shows that 28.50% of the sample’s firms operate in the United 
States, 14.00% in Japan, 9.50% in the United Kingdom, 9% in Canada and 6.30% in Australia. Contrary 
to this, the countries with the lowest representation are Portugal with 0.20%, 0.30% Austria, 0.40% New 
Zealand and 0.50% Norway.  
[Insert Table 1] 
The firms of the sample operate in nine sectors, which are provided in Table 2. The TRBC 
economic sector classification by Thomson Reuters is used in this research in order to categorise the 
industries of the firms. The sectors with the greatest representation are industrials, consumer cyclicals 
and basic metals with 22.00%, 19.10% and 13.70%, respectively, and the lowest representation comes 
from telecommunications services with 3.60% and utilities with 6.30%. 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
4.2 Dependent variable 
Our dependent variable is the percentage of female directors on boards. This variable is denoted 
by FEMALE_DIR and is calculated as the ratio between the total number of women directors on boards 
and the total number of directors on boards (i.e., Thams et al., 2018; Pucheta-Martínez et al., 2019). 
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4.3 Independent variables 
The national culture is measured by using the six Hofstede cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 1980, 
2001; Hofstede et al., 2010). This national culture dimension model has been used by earlier studies 
(Gallego-Álvarez and Ortas, 2017; Miska et al., 2018; Guptal et al., 2018) as a proxy for capturing the 
different cultures among countries. The six cultural dimensions are (1) power distance, defined as 
POW_DIST, (2) individualism versus collectivism, defined as INDIV, (3) masculinity versus 
femininity, labelled as MASCUL, (4) uncertainty avoidance, defined as UNC_AVOID, (5) long-term 
orientation, based on Confucian thinking, defined as LONG_ORIENTATION and (6) indulgence versus 
restraint, defined as INDULG. The six cultural dimensions vary from 0 to 100, with 50 being the halfway 
point. Countries with a score under 50 show a low culture score, while 50 or above is considered a high 
culture score. For instance, for the cultural dimension of masculinity versus femininity, a score under 
50 is categorised as a feminist culture, and above 50 as a masculinist culture. Hence, a country with a 
score of 20 would be a feminist context but less than a country with a score of 5, because this figure is 
nearer to 0. All the values associated with each culture dimension are publicly available through the 
website of Geert Hofstede2. 
 
4.4 Control variables  
We control several likely factors impacting the percentage of female directors on boards. Firstly, 
firm size is controlled (e.g., Azar & Drogendijk, 2016), denoted as SIZE and measured as the log of 
total assets of firms; return on assets (Zhang, 2011), labelled as ROA, and calculated as operating income 
before interests and taxes over total assets; and board size (Chouaibi et al., 2009; Haslam, et al., 2010), 
denoted as B_SIZE, measured as the number of directors on boards. Furthermore, CEODUALITY is 
also considered and is calculated as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO of the firm also 
serves as chairman of the board and 0, otherwise. The institutional system of the country where firms 
operate is also controlled (Fainshmidt et al., 2018). We base this on a classification provided by 
Fainshmidt et al. (2018), which is done according to a list of countries that past research has identified 
as heavily reliant on markets as the organising logic. The institutional systems provided are: (1) Market-
based (LME), (2) Collaborative (CME), (3) State-Led, (4) Fragmented with Fragile State, (5) Family-
Led, (6) Centralised Tribe, (7) Emergent LME, (8) Collaborative Agglomerations and (9) Hierarchically 
Coordinated. In this research, only five out of nine of these institutional systems have been used because 
the remaining are not available in our sample. Specifically, we use (1) Market-based (LME), denoted 
by MARKET-BASED (LME), (2) Collaborative (CME), denoted by COLLABORATIVE (CME), (3) 
State-Led, denoted by STATE_LED, (4) Family-Led, denoted by FAMILY_LED and (5) Emergent 
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LME, denoted by EMERGENT_LME. These variables are measured as a dummy variable, which will 
take the value 1 if the firm operates in a country with this institutional system and 0, otherwise. The rule 
of law of a country is denoted by RULE_LAW and ranges from 0 to 10. In this case, 5 will be the half-
way point. Thus, if the rule of law of a country scores a value of 2, for instance, it shows that the level 
of the rule of law in a country is low, while it will be higher if the score is 9. The efficiency of the 
judicial system is labelled by EFFICIEN_JUDIC_SYST and is measured from 0 to 10. In this case, 5 
will be the half-way point as well. Therefore, if the efficiency of the judicial system scores a value of 1, 
for example, it exhibits that the level of efficiency of the judicial system is low, whereas it will be higher 
if the score is 8. Finally, year effects (YEARt) are also controlled by considering a set of dummy 
variables. Table 3 shows a description of all variables. 
[Insert Table 3] 
4.5 Economic model  
With the following model, we will check our hypotheses:  
FEMALE_DIRit= β0+β1POW_DISTit +β2INDIVit +β3MASCULit +β4UNC_AVOIDit  
+β5LONG_ORIENTATIONit +β6INDULGit +β7SIZEit +β8ROA +β9B_SIZEit  
+β10CEODUALITYit +β11MARKETBASEDit +β12COLLABORATIVEit 
 +β13STATE_LEDit +β14FAMILY_LEDit +β15EMERGENT_LMEit +β16RULE_LAWit 
 +β17EFFICIEN_JUDIC_SYSTit +∑ βj YEARt + Ʋi  + ðit 
where Ʋi symbolises firm-fixed or firm-specific effects (the unobservable heterogeneity), which are 
controlled because they may affect the proportion of female directors on boards. By taking into account 
firm-fixed effects, the unobservable characteristics of companies are considered, which remain 
unchanged over time and vary among individuals, and ðit symbolises the error term. 
We use the generalised method of moments (GMM) procedure for estimating the model 
(Arellano & Bond, 1991, 1998). In contrast to other procedures, the GMM estimator controls 
unobservable heterogeneity (Ʋi). For this reason, the GMM estimator is more efficient and consistent 
than other estimators. With the GMM procedure, the endogeneity can also be controlled and the 
estimation bias can be mitigated.  
The estimation of our model with the GMM procedure will provide the following statistics: the 
Wald χ2 test, the Arellano-Bond tests AR(1) and AR(2) and the Hansen test. The fitness of our model 
will be assessed with the Wald χ2 test. The Arellano-Bond test AR(2) will allow us to assess if there is a 
second-order serial correlation in the first difference. A second-order serial correlation will not exist if 
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the null hypothesis of ‘no serial correlations’ is rejected. Lastly, the Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions shows us the appropriateness of the instruments employed in the model when rejecting the 
null hypothesis of non-correlation between the instruments and the error term. 
 
5. Analysis of Results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation 
Table 4 provides the mean, the standard deviation and the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of all 
the variables. The variable female directors (FEMALE_DIR) shows that the representation of female 
directors on boards is, on average, 11.74%. Regarding the six cultural dimensions, from 0 to 100, power 
distance (POW_DIST) is, on average, 45.17, individualism (INDIV) 72.37, masculinity (MASCUL) 
61.45, uncertainty avoidance (UNC_AVOID) 56.58, long-term orientation (LONG_ORIENTATION) 
48.13 and indulgence (INDULG) 59.54. Comparing the six cultural dimensions, it can be observed that 
there are four out of six dimensions with scores higher than 50, and two out of six with scores lower 
than 50. This suggests that the cultural contexts of the countries in our sample are quite individualistic 
and their masculinity, uncertainty avoidance and indulgence go from medium to high values. On the 
other hand, although power distance and long-term orientation dimensions show scores below 50, these 
values are near 50, showing that the levels of power distance and long-term orientation are also relevant 
in the cultures represented in our sample. Firm size (SIZE) is, on average, 9.83 (log of total assets), 
return on assets (ROA) 6.39%, board size (B_SIZE) is 10.90 board members and the firm’s CEO also 
serves as the chairman of the board in 34% of the sample’s firms (CEO DUALITY). 
According to the institutional system where firms are domiciled, 58% of the firms in the sample 
operate in a market-based (MARKET-BASED [LME]) institutional system, 32% in a collaborative 
(COLLABORATIVE [CME]), 5% in a state-led (STATE_LED), 3% in a family-led (FAMILY_LED) 
and 2% in an emergent LME (EMERGENT_LME). Finally, the rule of law of the countries in our 
sample is, on average, 9.25 out of 10 (RULE_LAW) and the efficiency of the judicial system is 9.36 out 
of 10 (EFFICIEN_JUDIC_SYST). 
[Insert Table 4] 
Table 5 presents the bivariate correlation matrix in order to explore the existence of 
multicollinearity. In general, an absolute correlation coefficient >0.8 among two or more explanatory 
variables indicates the presence of multicollinearity (Gujarati, 2009). As shown in Table 5, all pairs 
show values lower than 0.8. Therefore, there is no multicollinearity concern among the predictors.  
[Insert Table 5] 
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5.2 Multivariate analysis  
The findings for checking all the hypotheses are reported in Table 6. Model 1 examines the 
relationship between the cultural dimension of power distance and the proportion of female directors on 
boards. The coefficient of the power distance variable is positive, contrary to our expectation, and it is 
statistically significant. This result leads us to reject the first hypothesis, which suggests that the 
proportion of women directors on boards will be lower in countries with high levels of power distance. 
Our finding supports the view that companies located in contexts with a high power distance tend to 
increase the proportion of females in economic and political power, such as boards, in order to equal the 
distribution of power in institutions and organisations. This evidence is in line with Uribe-Bohorquez et 
al. (2019), who documented that firms domiciled in countries with higher power distance have a stronger 
presence of female directors on boards than if firms are located in countries with a lower level of this 
dimension. Gyapong and Afrifa (2019) also support this thesis. The worldwide situation about the role 
of women on boards has changed over the last years. Policy-makers have established a set of good 
governance codes and laws recommending or imposing gender quotas on corporate boards with the 
purpose of promoting gender diversity on boards or on top positions in firms. Society does not accept 
rigid hierarchies in firms and, accordingly, although power distance exists in a culture, the proportion 
of female directors on boards will tend to increase because board gender diversity is a corporate 
governance issue and, at the same time, people make decisions cognizant of their legitimacy implications 
(Scott, 1995). Our evidence is in contrast with Sing et al. (2002) and Farrell and Hersch (2005), who 
find that the presence of female directors on boards is lower in contexts where the power distance is 
high.  
Model 2 examines the impact of an individualistic culture on the proportion of female directors 
on boards. The coefficient for the individualist cultural dimension is positive, as predicted, and is 
statistically significant. According to this, the second hypothesis cannot be rejected. Hence, our results 
suggest that the proportion of women directors on corporate boards is greater in societies where high 
levels of individualism exist. In this regard, Carrasco et al. (2015) and Uribe-Bohorquez et al. (2019) 
support that in individualist cultures, companies are more likely to have female directors on boards since 
they are more efficient than male directors. Cultural contexts characterised by patterns of individualism 
will be expected to have more female directors because companies tend to value individual uniqueness 
and diversity (Chang et al., 2017). Diverse resources from boards of directors such as the presence of 
female directors might be fully recognised and utilised for companies. In individualistic cultures, the 
individual making-decision process prevails instead of a group process. This fact allows managers the 
ability to appoint female directors on corporate boards without obtaining the approval of all 
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stakeholders. For this reason, companies operating in individualist cultures will be more likely to include 
female directors on boards.  
In Model 3, we analyse how the cultural dimension of masculinity affects the proportion of 
female directors on boards. As shown in Model 3, the masculinity variable is negative, as expected, and 
is statistically significant. Thus, we cannot reject the third hypothesis, which posits that societies with 
high levels of masculinity result in a lower proportion of female directors on boards. Our evidence is 
consistent with Carrasco et al. (2015) and Uribe-Bohorquez et al. (2019), who document a negative 
association between the cultural dimension of masculinity and the presence of women directors on 
boards. Cultures with high levels of masculinity will be likely to make administrative decisions, will be 
oriented towards performance and will have competitive behaviour (Chizema et al., 2015). In contrast, 
societies with high levels of femininity will tend to make cooperative decisions. Accordingly, contexts 
with male patterns may reduce the proportion of women directors on boards because managers will not 
be willing to appoint female directors with cooperative behaviour. Thus, companies located in masculine 
societies will prefer to have male directors on boards because they have similar abilities such as 
ambition, assertiveness or aggressiveness, among others, in the decision-making process, as well as 
having a traditional point of view about women. Masculine cultures reflect gender diversity roles in a 
traditional and stereotyped way. In this regard, contexts where the presence of males prevails will have 
a lower likelihood of increasing the percentage of female directors on boards because their behaviours, 
abilities and stereotypes might affect negatively their appointment on boards.  
In Model 4, we explore the effect of the cultural dimension of uncertainty avoidance on the 
presence of female directors on boards. The variable of uncertainty avoidance is negatively associated 
with board gender diversity, as expected, but it is not statistically significant. This finding does not 
support our fourth hypothesis and it cannot be accepted. This evidence suggests that uncertainty 
avoidance does not impact the proportion of female directors. Our results show that that the level of 
uncertainty avoidance in a society is not a relevant determinant of the percentage of women directors on 
boards. In other words, the presence of female directors on boards is not affected by cultures where 
uncertainty avoidance prevails. This is in contrast to Grosvol (2011), Carrasco et al. (2015) and Nguyen 
et al. (2017), who document that societies characterised by uncertainty avoidance tend to incorporate 
more female directors on their corporate boards. This is because, in their view, this cultural dimension 
tends to be individualist and appreciates feminine traits as important factors in including female directors 
on boards. It was expected that there would be a lower proportion of female directors on boards in 
societies with higher uncertainty avoidance because in these societies there will be more risk-sensitivity, 
more rules and regulations and intolerance towards the social changes. In this regard, in these 
communities, the role of minority classes, such as female directors, should be lower because the 
members of organisations who make decisions may tend to consider their presence as increasing risk 
and uncertainty (Simmons et al., 2012). However, we found that uncertainty avoidance cultures do not 
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associate women directors as a better or worse mechanism to protect themselves from the uncertainties 
of society. 
In Model 5, we examine the association between the long-term orientation dimension and the 
proportion of women directors on boards. The variable of long-term orientation reports a negative and 
significant effect on the proportion of female directors, as expected. This result, thus, led us to not reject 
the fifth hypothesis, which predicts that a culture with a high long-term orientation leads organisations 
to appoint a lower proportion of female directors on boards, in line with the Confucian dynamic 
supported by Hofstede and Bond (1988) and Moulettes (2007). Societies characterised by long-term 
orientation are dominated by male role models. In this case, long-term orientation culture represents the 
extent to which a society prioritises long-term goals instead of short-term ones, adapts their traditions 
to modern approaches, invests in modern education to prepare for the future and in which people have 
important savings and the funds available for investment with long-term results. Our findings are in line 
with the views of Uribe‐Bohorquez et al. (2019), who show that women directors sit on firms’ boards 
domiciled in long-term orientation contexts and tend to be less efficient in their work.  
In Model 6, we check the impact of indulgent cultures on the proportion of female directors on 
boards. The variable of indulgence exhibits a positive sign, as predicted, and it is statistically significant. 
It implies that more indulgent societies have a higher probability of appointing women directors. Thus, 
we cannot reject the sixth hypothesis. Indulgent cultures will prefer several gratifications based on 
freedom, happiness and a healthy life. In contrast, restraint cultures will focus on regulations and strict 
social norms, which will remove the gratifications of basic needs. According to Hofstede et al. (2010) 
and Newton (2018), the more indulgent a society is, the higher proportion of female directors in the 
labour force there will be because the female roles in indulgent communities are perceived wider in 
contrast with restraint cultures whose female roles are stricter. Firms domiciliated in indulgent contexts 
seem to be more engaged with the inclusion of female directors on boards because the freedom of speech 
and the freedom of cultural norms will result in societies with a higher acceptance of appointing women 
directors on boards.  
Relating to the control variables, in Models 3 and 6 the institutional systems MARKET-BASED 
(LME) and COLLABORATIVE (CME) have a positive impact on the proportion of female directors on 
corporate boards. Moreover, in Model 1, the institutional system STATE-LED negatively affects the 
percentage of women directors on boards, and FAMILY_LED has a positive impact in Model 6. The 
variable of rule of law of a country (RULE_LAW) is negatively associated with the proportion of female 
directors on boards in Models 2, 3, 5 and 6, and the efficiency of the judicial system 
(EFFICIEN_JUDIC_SYST) also impacts negatively on board gender diversity in Model 6. The rest of 
the control variables are not statistically significant.  
[Insert Table 6] 
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6. Conclusions and future directions  
The main goal of this study is to analyse the impact of the six Hofstede cultural dimensions 
(power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation and 
indulgence) on the proportion of female directors on boards. This manuscript is based on institutional 
theory, which suggests that companies are influenced by cultural aspects that interact with their 
environments throughout their relations among different stakeholders. In this regard, this approach 
supports our thesis that the presence of women directors on boards may be affected by the cultural 
context where firms operate.  
Our findings show that the proportion of female directors on boards is positively influenced by 
the power distance, individualist and indulgence cultural dimensions, and negatively by the masculinity 
and long-term orientation dimensions. On the other hand, the uncertainty avoidance dimension does not 
affect board gender diversity. Therefore, companies located in high power distance cultures as well as 
in individualist and indulgent cultures will be more likely to appoint female directors on their boards, 
while they will be less likely to be domiciled in masculine and long-term orientation contexts. However, 
whether a culture has a higher or lower level of uncertainty avoidance is not relevant.  
The findings of our research have several implications. Firstly, our results support the premise 
that the culture where a firm operates should be taken into account by policy-makers and regulators 
when recommending or obligating a gender quota on firms, especially on boards. This may allow society 
to mitigate the masculine stereotypes in firms and promote the appointment of women in top positions 
such as board members. Secondly, we shed new light on the impact of cultural dimensions on the 
appointment of female directors on boards. In line with the institutional approach, most papers show the 
negative effects of the power distance, individualist and uncertainty avoidance cultural dimensions on 
board gender diversity, while our findings provide positive or insignificant results. In this regard, power 
distance and individualism negatively affect the percentage of female directors on boards and 
uncertainty avoidance does not impact it. Additionally, this study is the first, as far as we know, which 
evidences that the cultural dimension of indulgence has a positive impact on female directors on boards. 
Thus, this paper extends knowledge about the impact of the cultural dimensions of Hofstede on board 
gender diversity and proposes new possibilities of research for culture and corporate governance 
literature. We encourage other researchers to deepen the analysis of the indulgence dimension in other 
board gender diversity characteristics. Thirdly, our evidence may be useful for users and stakeholders, 
particularly those who are engaged with social concerns such as the promotion of female directors on 
firms’ top positions. Potential investors oriented towards issues such as the role played by women on 
management positions might make decisions about where to invest, depending on the culture where 
firms operate. Finally, companies and managers interested in signalling to society and stakeholders their 
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commitment to social issues related to the role of female directors on boards may benefit from our 
evidence. Cultures with high levels of power distance, individualism and indulgence would be more 
appropriate contexts where firms and managers engaged with board gender diversity may operate.  
This manuscript has some limitations. Firstly, this paper has used Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions, which have both supporters and detractors. Thus, other constructs or proxies can be used 
for measuring cultural contexts as an alternative to Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. Another limitation 
involves the control variables used. Firm size and return on assets have been used, but not the level of 
leverage, for instance, which may impact the presence of female directors on boards. Finally, the number 
of years analysed may be another limitation. An extension of the years explored may be beneficial for 
the research in order to validate our evidence.  
These limitations lead to future lines of research. Firstly, it would be interesting to analyse if the 
cultural context has an impact on debt policy, particularly regarding short- and long-term debt. Secondly, 
it would also be interesting to explore if the cultural dimensions affect firm performance or firm 




1. Stereotypes are constituted by ideas, prejudices, attitudes, beliefs and preconceived opinions, imposed by the 
social and cultural environment, which are applied in general to all persons belonging to a category, nationality, 
ethnicity, age, sex, sexual orientation or geographical origin, among others.  
 
2. The cultural insights website of Geert Hofstede can be accessed at https://www.geert-hofstede.com/ 
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Number of observations by country 
Country  Observations Percentage Cum. 
Australia 784 6.30% 6.30% 
Austria 41 0.30% 6.60% 
Belgium 95 0.80% 7.40% 
Brazil 250 2.00% 9.40% 
Canada 1,124 9.00% 18.50% 
Chile 108 0.90% 19.30% 
China 335 2.70% 22.00% 
Denmark 113 0.90% 22.90% 
Finland 138 1.10% 24.00% 
27 
France 560 4.50% 28.50% 
Germany 396 3.20% 31.70% 
Hong Kong 125 1.00% 32.70% 
India 168 1.40% 34.10% 
Ireland 170 1.40% 35.50% 
Italy 133 1.10% 36.50% 
Japan 1,741 14.00% 50.50% 
Mexico 121 1.00% 51.50% 
Netherlands 214 1.70% 53.20% 
New Zealand 52 0.40% 53.60% 
Norway 67 0.50% 54.20% 
Portugal 29 0.20% 54.40% 
Spain 209 1.70% 56.10% 
Sweden 256 2.10% 58.20% 
Switzerland 384 3.10% 61.30% 
Thailand 95 0.80% 62.00% 
United Kingdom 1,178 9.50% 71.50% 
United States  3,543 28.50% 100.00% 




Number of firms and observations by activity sector 






Basic Materials 1,704 13.70% 13.70% 
Consumer Cyclicals 2,374 19.10% 32.80% 
Consumer Non-cyclicals 1,244 10.00% 42.80% 
Energy 1,171 9.40% 52.20% 
Healthcare 983 7.90% 60.10% 
28 
Industrials 2,739 22.00% 82.20% 
Technology 995 8.00% 90.20% 
Telecommunications services 442 3.60% 93.70% 
Utilities 777 6.30% 100.00% 



















FEMALE_DIR Proportion of female directors on boards = Total number of female directors on boards / 
Total number of directors on boards 
POW_DIST Power distance is one of the six culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede et al. (2010) 
and ranges from 0 to 100 
INDIV Individualism is one of the six culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede et al. (2010) and 
ranges from 0 to 100 
MASCUL Masculinity is one of the six culture dimensions addressed by  Hofstede et al. (2010) and 
ranges from 0 to 100 
UNC_AVOID Uncertainty avoidance is one of the six culture dimensions addressed by  Hofstede et al. 
(2010) and ranges from 0 to 100 
LONG_ORIENTATION Long-term orientation is one of the six culture dimensions addressed by  Hofstede et al. 
(2010) and ranges from 0 to 100 
INDULG Indulgence is one of the six culture dimensions addressed by  Hofstede et al. (2010) and 
ranges from 0 to 100 
SIZE The log of total assets 
ROA Operating income before interests and taxes over total assets 
B_SIZE Number of directors on board 
CEODUALITY Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO of the firm also serves as chairman of 
the board and 0, otherwise 
MARKET-BASED(LME) Dummy variable: 1 = If firms operate in a country with a market-based (LME) 
institutional system; 0 = Otherwise 
COLLABORATIVE (CME) Dummy variable: 1 = If firms operate in a country with a collaborative (CME) institutional 
system; 0 = Otherwise 
STATE_LED Dummy variable: 1 = If firms operate in a country with a State-Led institutional system; 
0 = Otherwise 
FAMILY_LED Dummy variable: 1 = If firms operate in a country with a Family-Led institutional system; 
0 = Otherwise 
EMERGENT_LME Dummy variable: 1 = If firms operate in a country with an emergent LME institutional 
system; 0 = Otherwise 
RULE_LAW This variable measures the rule of law of a country and ranges from 0 to 10 
EFFICIEN_JUDIC_SYST This variable measures the efficiency of the judicial system of a country and ranges from 






























p25 p50 p75 
FEMALE_DIR 12,429 11.74 11.06 0.00 11.11 18.18 
POW_DIST 12,429 45.17 13.33 38.00 40.00 54.00 
INDIV 12,429 72.37 21.28 51.00 80.00 91.00 
MASCUL 12,429 61.45 19.24 52.00 62.00 66.00 
UNC_AVOID 12,429 56.58 20.54 46.00 48.00 76.00 
31 
Mean, standard deviation and percentile 25, 50 and 75. FEMALE_DIR is the proportion of female directors on boards = Total number of 
female directors on boards / Total number of directors on boards; POW_DIST is the power distance, one of the six culture dimensions addressed 
by Hofstede et al. (2010) and ranges from 0 to 100; INDIV is the individualism, one of the six culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede et al. 
(2010) and ranges from 0 to 100; MASCUL is masculinity, one of the six culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede et al. (2010) and ranges 
from 0 to 100; UNC_AVOID represents uncertainty avoidance, one of the six culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede et al. (2010)  and 
ranges from 0 to 100; LONG_ORIENTATION represents long-term orientation, one of the six culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede et 
al. (2010) and ranges from 0 to 100; INDULG represents indulgence, one of the six culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede et al. (2010) 
and ranges from 0 to 100; SIZE is the log of total assets; ROA is the operating income before interests and taxes over total assets; B_SIZE is 
the number of directors on a board; CEODUALITY is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO of the firm also serves as chairman 
of the board and 0, otherwise; MARKET-BASED (LME) is measured as a dummy variable: 1 = If firms operate in a country with a market-
based (LME) institutional system; 0 = Otherwise; COLLABORATIVE (CME) is a dummy variable: 1 = If firms operate in a country with a 
collaborative (CME) institutional system; 0 = Otherwise; STATE_LED is a dummy variable: 1 = If firms operate in a country with a State-
Led institutional system; 0 = Otherwise; FAMILY_LED is a dummy variable: 1 = If firms operate in a country with a Family-Led institutional 
system; 0 = Otherwise; EMERGENT_LME is a dummy variable: 1 = If firms operate in a country with an emergent LME institutional system; 
0 = Otherwise; RULE_LAW is the rule of law of a country and ranges from 0 to 10 and EFFICIEN_JUDIC_SYST is the efficiency of the 










LONG_ORIENTATION 12,429 48.13 24.07 25.70 38.29 67.00 
INDULG 12,429 59.54 14.82 43.53 68.08 68.31 
SIZE 12,429 9.83 0.61 9.42 9.82 10.25 
ROA 12,429 6.39 7.83 2.75 5.51 9.47 
B_SIZE 12,429 10.90 3.58 9.00 10.00 13.00 
CEODUALITY 12,429 0.30 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 
MARKET-BASED(LME) 12,429 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00 
COLLABORATIVE (CME) 12,429 0.32 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 
STATE_LED 12,429 0.05 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 
FAMILY_LED 12,429 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 
EMERGENT_LME 12,429 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 
RULE_LAW 12,429 9.25 1.12 8.98 10.00 10.00 






FEMALE_DIR is the proportion of female directors on boards = Total number of female directors on boards / Total number of directors on boards; 
POW_DIST is the power distance, one of the six culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede et al. (2010) and ranges from 0 to 100; INDIV is the 
individualism, one of the six culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede et al. (2010) and ranges from 0 to 100; MASCUL is masculinity, one of the six 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
FEMALE_DIR (1) 1.00                  
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culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede et al. (2010) and ranges from 0 to 100; UNC_AVOID represents uncertainty avoidance, one of the six culture 
dimensions addressed by Hofstede et al. (2010)  and ranges from 0 to 100; LONG_ORIENTATION represents long-term orientation, one of the six 
culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede et al. (2010) and ranges from 0 to 100; INDULG represents indulgence, one of the six culture dimensions 
addressed by Hofstede et al. (2010) and ranges from 0 to 100; SIZE is the log of total assets; ROA is the operating income before interests and taxes 
over total assets; B_SIZE is the number of directors on a board; CEODUALITY is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO of the firm also 
serves as chairman of the board and 0, otherwise; MARKET-BASED (LME) is measured as a dummy variable: 1 = If firms operate in a country with a 
market-based (LME) institutional system; 0 = Otherwise; COLLABORATIVE (CME) is a dummy variable: 1 = If firms operate in a country with a 
collaborative (CME) institutional system; 0 = Otherwise; STATE_LED is a dummy variable: 1 = If firms operate in a country with a State-Led 
institutional system; 0 = Otherwise; FAMILY_LED is a dummy variable: 1 = If firms operate in a country with a Family-Led institutional system; 0 = 
Otherwise; EMERGENT_LME is a dummy variable: 1 = If firms operate in a country with an emergent LME institutional system; 0 = Otherwise; 
RULE_LAW is the rule of law of a country and ranges from 0 to 10 and EFFICIEN_JUDIC_SYST is the efficiency of the judicial system of a country 






















































































































MARKET-BASED(LME) 8.65 -20.18 26.45** 8.60 1.76 34.36** 
35 
 
(0.463) (0.184) (0.021) (0.433) (0.882) (0.031) 




























































Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald χ2 test 3571.75*** 4203.66*** 3468.98*** 3529.77*** 3566.36*** 3912.01*** 
Arellano−–Bond test AR(1) (z. p>|z|) −14.15 (0.000) -15.19 (0.000) -13.56 (0.000) -14.08 (0.000) -14.44(0.000) -14.35 (0.000) 
Arellano−–Bond test AR(2) (z. p>|z|) 0.48(0.633) 0.24 (0.813) 0.14 (0.889) 0.03 (0.979) 1.78 (0.175) 2.67 (0.408) 
Hansen test (chi−square. p>|chi2|) 73.12 (0.344) 62.84 (0.686) 63.31 (0.670) 72.55 (0.362) 57.88 (0.554) 65.37 (0.534) 
 
FEMALE_DIR is the proportion of female directors on boards = Total number of female directors on boards / Total number of directors on boards; 
POW_DIST is the power distance, one of the six culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede et al. (2010) and ranges from 0 to 100; INDIV is the 
individualism, one of the six culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede et al. (2010) and ranges from 0 to 100; MASCUL is masculinity, one of the six 
culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede et al. (2010) and ranges from 0 to 100; UNC_AVOID represents uncertainty avoidance, one of the six culture 
dimensions addressed by Hofstede et al. (2010)  and ranges from 0 to 100; LONG_ORIENTATION represents long-term orientation, one of the six 
culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede et al. (2010) and ranges from 0 to 100; INDULG represents indulgence, one of the six culture dimensions 
addressed by Hofstede et al. (2010) and ranges from 0 to 100; SIZE is the log of total assets; ROA is the operating income before interests and taxes 
over total assets; B_SIZE is the number of directors on a board; CEODUALITY is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO of the firm also 
serves as chairman of the board and 0, otherwise; MARKET-BASED (LME) is measured as a dummy variable: 1 = If firms operate in a country with a 
market-based (LME) institutional system; 0 = Otherwise; COLLABORATIVE (CME) is a dummy variable: 1 = If firms operate in a country with a 
collaborative (CME) institutional system; 0 = Otherwise; STATE_LED is a dummy variable: 1 = If firms operate in a country with a State-Led 
institutional system; 0 = Otherwise; FAMILY_LED is a dummy variable: 1 = If firms operate in a country with a Family-Led institutional system; 0 = 
Otherwise; EMERGENT_LME is a dummy variable: 1 = If firms operate in a country with an emergent LME institutional system; 0 = Otherwise; 
RULE_LAW is the rule of law of a country and ranges from 0 to 10 and EFFICIEN_JUDIC_SYST is the efficiency of the judicial system of a country 
and ranges from 0 to 10. *p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01. 
 
 
